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SECTION 559.21 AND ROMAIN
1

A. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners

Minnesota is virtually unique in American law as having a
statutory non-judicial process that provides for the quick
termination of the rights of a purchaser under a contract for deed,
2
also known as an installment land contract. Minnesota Statutes
section 559.21 provides for a process whereby, upon a default by a
buyer under a contract for deed, the seller can terminate all rights
of the buyer under the contract for deed without invoking the
3
jurisdiction of a court. The statute provides that if a default occurs
that would give the seller a right to terminate the contract, the
seller can serve notice, in the form prescribed by statute, on the
4
buyer. If the buyer fails to cure defaults within the statutorily
specified time, typically sixty days after service of the notice, the
contract is deemed terminated and an affidavit of such service and
failure to comply constitutes prima facie evidence of the
5
termination.
Statutory termination under section 559.21 applies if “a default
occurs in the conditions of a contract for the conveyance of real
6
estate . . . [that gives] the seller a right to terminate it.” In Romain
7
v. Pebble Creek Partners, the Minnesota Supreme Court was directly
faced with the issue of whether section 559.21 applies to a purchase
8
agreement.
In Romain, the court first noted that it was indisputable that
9
the statute applied to a “contract for deed.” While noting that
there is no definitive definition of a contract for deed, the court
pointed out its primary characteristics: that “vendor and vendee are
bound to sale and purchase by definite terms; the vendee usually
1. 310 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 1981).
2. Iowa is the only other state with a similar cancellation statute. See IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-.6 (West 1995).
3. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002).
4. Id. subd. 3.
5. Id. subd. 4(e).
6. Id. subd. 2a.
7. 310 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 1981).
8. The 1978 version of section 559.21 at issue in Romain was phrased slightly
different than the current statute and applied “[w]hen default is made in the
conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate . . . whereby the
vendor has a right to terminate the same.” Id. at 120.
9. Id.
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takes possession; and the contract works an equitable conversion, the
10
vendor retaining legal title and the vendee having equitable title.”
Thus, a contract for deed is primarily a financing instrument. The
court in Romain went on to contrast a contract for deed with a
purchase agreement.
[T]he distinction between contracts for deed and
purchase agreements is similarly unclear. A purchase
agreement (or earnest money contract) often is a
preliminary contract “to bind the bargain” until the
closing, at which time possession is delivered and title is
passed by deed or contract for deed. The purchase
agreement frequently is conditioned on certain material
terms respecting title or financing being satisfied in the
11
interim period before closing.
A purchase agreement, in contrast to a contract for deed, is
not a financing device but rather is normally of a short-term
duration under which the buyer does not pay interest, take
possession, or enjoy beneficial use of the property. As such, a
purchase agreement is more in the nature of a holding instrument
that keeps the parties bound while certain tasks, such as examining
title, arranging financing, or seeking rezoning, are accomplished.
Romain adopted the view that statutory termination under
section 559.21 applies regardless of whether the contract is a
12
purchase agreement or a contract for deed.
The issue of the
applicability of section 559.21 is not resolved by whether an
instrument is labeled a contract for deed or a purchase agreement,
and “is not dependent on how the parties may have manipulated
13
the contract language.”
Under Romain, a contract may be
statutorily cancelled if the agreement is “sufficiently certain and
complete in its essential terms that ordinarily specific performance
14
will lie.”
The inquiry is “whether a term essential to the final
bargain is left open for further negotiations or is dependent on a
15
contingency.”
While mentioned only in passing in Romain, the doctrine of
equitable conversion is central to understanding the case. The
doctrine of equitable conversion is based on the maxim that
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
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“[e]quity regards and treats that as done which in good conscience
16
ought to be done.” Because real property is unique, a purchaser
under a definite, non-contingent agreement has the remedy of
17
specific performance. Upon payment of the specified purchase
price, the purchaser is entitled to an order requiring the seller to
18
execute and deliver a deed. Equity principles treat that which
ought to be done, that is, delivery of the deed, as being done
19
throughout the term of the contract. Therefore, despite the fact
that the seller has not given a deed and has only entered into a
contract, equity regards the purchaser as the equitable owner and
the seller as the holder of mere legal title to the property.
Most importantly, under equitable conversion, the buyer has a
property interest in the real estate that is the subject of the
contract. As such, the buyer’s property interest constitutes both a
cloud on the seller’s title and a right, upon payment of the
purchase price, to entirely oust the seller of all title. Moreover, as a
property interest, the buyer’s equitable interest does not simply
disappear if the buyer fails to timely perform. That property
interest can be extinguished by means of a deed from the seller to
the buyer (or other consensual instrument signed by the buyer).
Short of such an instrument, that property interest remains extant.
Thus, under Romain, the conclusion that equitable conversion has
occurred means not only that section 559.21 applies to the contract
in question, but that, absent a deed (or other consensual
instrument) from the buyer, until statutory termination has been
effected, the buyer has a property interest that prevents the seller
from selling the real estate to a third party and that will permit the
buyer to acquire the seller’s interest in the real estate.
As Romain recognized, equitable conversion may apply to a
20
purchase agreement as well as a contract for deed. Thus, in the
case of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, equitable
conversion will have occurred and the buyer under the mere
16. Gilles v. Sprout, 293 Minn. 53, 59, 196 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1972).
17. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 122.
18. See Schumacher v. Ihrke, 469 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding the trial court’s grant of specific performance, even though other
remedies may be available, because real property is unique).
19. See Gilles, 293 Minn. at 59, 196 N.W.2d at 615.
20. See Stiernagle v. County of Waseca, 511 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1994) (“[A]
contract for deed works an equitable conversion of the real property conveyed.”);
Frederick v. Peoples State Bank of Madison Lake, 385 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (“[E]quitable conversion occurs at the time a purchase agreement is
signed.”).
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purchase agreement will have a property interest—an interest
which remains outstanding unless and until the buyer executes a
deed (or other instrument) or the seller effectuates statutory
21
termination under section 559.21.
The Romain court went on to analyze the particular purchase
22
agreement at issue in the case before it. The agreement provided
that the purchase price would be payable at closing by means of a
promissory note given by the buyers to the sellers, the security for
which was not (as is customary) the real estate being purchased,
23
but rather other collateral satisfactory to the seller.
If an
agreement regarding such other security was not made, the
24
purchase agreement would then be null and void.
The court
concluded that, given the significance of the collateral for the
payment obligation, “there was an essential term left open” and
“that it became null and void by reason of the parties’ not reaching
agreement on security for the note; and, consequently, that notice
under section 559.21 to terminate the purchasers’ interest was not
25
needed.”
In effect, the court concluded that because the
purchase agreement was not sufficiently definite to permit the
buyers to procure specific performance of the agreement,
equitable conversion had not occurred, the buyers did not have a
property interest in the underlying real estate, and statutory
termination under section 559.21 was not required to extinguish
26
any real estate interest of the buyers. Ironically then, while the
teaching of Romain is that section 559.21 applies to purchase
agreements and that a purchase agreement may require statutory
cancellation, the actual holding of the case is that the particular
27
purchase agreement at issue did not warrant termination.
In addition to the situation of the failure to stipulate collateral
for the unpaid purchase agreement, Romain noted prior cases
involving purchase agreements where the termination statute did
not apply and, in effect, where no statutory termination was
28
required to extinguish a property interest in the buyer. Thus, in
the case where a title defect not due to the fault of the seller made
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002).
Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 122-23.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 121.
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title unmarketable, the purchase agreement ended by its terms
29
without the need for a cancellation notice. Similarly, the Romain
court recognized that statutory termination is not required in the
case of a purchase agreement that is subject to an unsatisfied
30
financing contingency, the failure of which voids the agreement.
31
That latter rule has also been followed in a post-Romain case. In
addition, other case law indicates that an option, until exercised,
will normally not be subject to section 559.21 based on the theory
that an unexercised option is not binding on both parties and
32
hence not subject to specific performance.
Nevertheless, the Romain court also pointed to prior cases
which did require that definite, non-contingent purchase
33
agreements be terminated under the statutory procedure. These
purchase agreements themselves provided that if the buyer failed
to make timely payments to the seller, the contract either would be
34
null and void or would end.
Romain recognized that the
applicability of section 559.21 “is not dependent on how the parties
35
may have manipulated the contract language.”
Thus, mere
insertion of language that failure of a party to perform
automatically nullifies or ends the contract does not avoid the
applicability of the termination statute to an otherwise definite,
non-contingent purchase agreement.
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that
29. Joslyn v. Schwend, 85 Minn. 130, 88 N.W. 410 (1901) (cited by Romain,
310 N.W.2d at 121). This case, which involved an actual title defect that rendered
title unmarketable, should not be read to stand for the proposition that the mere
existence of a contingency for title examination precludes equitable conversion.
Virtually all purchase agreements contain such a contingency and such a rule
would, in effect, make section 559.21 inapplicable to all purchase agreements, a
conclusion rejected by Romain.
30. See Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121 (citing Liebsch v. Abbott, 265 Minn. 447,
456, 122 N.W.2d 578, 584 (1963) and Chapman v. Salem Lutheran Church, 301
Minn. 486, 487-88, 221 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1974)).
31. Jones v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 N.W.2d 718, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
32. See Rooney v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 310 Minn. 256, 267-68, 246 N.W.2d
170, 176 (1976); see also In re Hilltop Dev. v. Miller Hill Manor Co., 342 N.W.2d
344, 348 (Minn. 1984) (holding that if the option has been exercised, a contract is
created and the cancellation statute applies). But see M.L. Gordon Sash & Door
Co. v. Mormann, 271 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Minn. 1978) (holding, albeit not in the
context of a cancellation, that in equity an unmistakable option granted a
purchaser a “property interest” so as to defeat an intervening judgment creditor).
33. Ballard v. Friedman, 151 Minn. 493, 187 N.W. 518 (1922); Finnes v.
Selover, Bates & Co., 102 Minn. 334, 113 N.W. 883 (1907).
34. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121-22.
35. Id. at 122.
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“[r]eal estate purchase agreements are unique because they are
36
subject to the provisions of” section 559.21. In another recent
case, the court of appeals concluded that because a purchase
agreement was definite and not subject to contingencies, the buyer
would be entitled to the notice and cure rights under section
559.21 in the event of the buyer’s default—notwithstanding the fact
that the purchase agreement provided that the agreement would
be “null and void and of no consequence to either party” if the
37
buyer failed to perform.
B. Romain’s Rationale
As an initial matter, one might question the very reasoning of
Romain’s initial conclusion, that is, why should any purchase
agreement ever be subject to statutory cancellation? Although
Romain analyzes the statutory framework of section 559.21, the
court does not delve into the underlying policy or rationales. The
justification for its conclusions is not as clear as one might initially
suspect.
There is little question that a buyer under a contract for deed,
who has typically gone into possession, who has attained significant
equity in the property through the down payment, and possibly
installment payments, to the seller, but who has defaulted in
installment payments (or the final balloon payment), should be
entitled to a statutorily imposed cure period and should not lose
his or her equity without notice and a right of cure. It is not so
clear, however, why a buyer under a purchase agreement, who has
not gone into possession, who has normally made only a nominal
payment of earnest money, who has invested no real equity in the
property, but who has failed to show up at closing, should likewise
be entitled to a statutorily-imposed cure period. There are typically
far greater equities in favor of the contract for deed buyer.
In addition, the impact of applying section 559.21 to a
purchase agreement seller may, in fact, be far more onerous than
applying section 559.21 to a contract for deed seller. In the
situation of a contract for deed seller, the statutory notice and cure
38
period will normally only delay the seller’s receipt of promised
36. Edina Dev. Corp. v. Hurrle, 670 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
37. TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 103-04
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
38. MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 2(a) (2002). “[N]otice must state that the
contract will terminate sixty days, or a shorter period allowed in subdivision 4,
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installment payments or, if the contract is terminated, the seller
may receive a windfall. In applying section 559.21 to a purchase
39
agreement, however, the statutory notice and cure period will
leave the seller (whose primary purpose was to conclusively dispose
of the property) in limbo and frustrated in his ability to remarket
the property to another buyer; if the purchase agreement is
terminated, the seller will only recover the typically nominal
earnest money.
This situation can be exacerbated by a companion statute to
section 559.21, section 559.211, which allows a court, upon motion
of a buyer in connection with a civil action against the seller, to
extend the cure period indefinitely by means of a temporary
40
restraining order or a temporary injunction. Furthermore, even if
the temporary injunction against the termination is ultimately
lifted because the buyer’s action is found to be without merit, the
injunction statute provides that the contract does not terminate for
fifteen days after the temporary injunction or restraining order is
41
lifted.
Thus, in effect, a buyer under a purchase agreement meeting
the Romain test has an automatic right to extend the closing date
until a minimum thirty-day period after the seller serves the
statutory notice and such period can be extended thereafter
indefinitely by court order (and, in all cases, for a minimum of
42
fifteen more days after a temporary injunction or order is lifted).
Since all the buyer risks by running out the statutory cure period is
the loss of earnest money, which often may be an amount as little as
$500, it may appear an unfair bargain to force a seller to keep the
property off the market pending completion of the termination
proceeding. In effect, under Romain, by risking only what may be a
nominal amount of earnest money, a defaulting buyer can “buy” at
least thirty days and perhaps much longer for the purpose of
keeping the property tied up and attempting to eventually close.
In defense of Romain, however, it can be seen as a modest
attempt to avoid unfair forfeitures by purchase agreement buyers of
both their earnest money, and more importantly, the right to buy
after the service of the notice” unless the purchaser is able to cure the defaults
prior to the termination date. Id.
39. Id.
40. See MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002).
41. Id. subd. 1.
42. Edina Dev. Corp., 670 N.W.2d at 597 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21 subds.
(2)(a), (4)(a); 559.211, subd. 1).
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intrinsically unique real estate. It reflects a policy judgment that
while there may be abuses, it is a reasonable compromise of the
competing interests and the importance of making sure that
Minnesota buyers are protected.
Even if one concludes that applying section 559.21 to purchase
agreements makes sense as a matter of public policy, one might
question the specific test for applying section 559.21 to the
purchase agreement under Romain—basing the applicability of
section 559.21 to the existence of a definite and non-contingent
43
purchase agreement. As to a definite purchase agreement where
all material terms are agreed upon, the test that the purchase
44
agreement in Romain failed, it makes sense that if a purchase
agreement is not definite with respect to all major terms, a court
could not grant specific performance to the buyer. In that case,
equitable conversion has not occurred, the buyer does not have a
property interest, and there is nothing “there” upon which one
could require that the statute act so as to extinguish a property
interest in the buyer.
More questionable is a purchase agreement containing a
contingency to the buyer’s performance or an unexercised option,
both of which, under Romain, do not require application of the
45
statute. In those cases it is true that a seller would not be entitled
to specific performance against the buyer. In the case of the
contingent purchase agreement, the buyer’s obligations are
contingent on satisfying a particular condition. Similarly, in the
case of an unexercised option, the buyer has no obligations
whatsoever until the option is exercised. However, in the case of
both the contingent purchase agreement and the unexercised
option, the buyer could usually unilaterally place him or herself in
the position of being entitled to specific performance against the
seller by simply waiving the contingency, in the case of a contingent
purchase agreement, or by tendering notice of exercise of the
option, in the case of an option agreement. In other words, in
both cases the seller lacks the remedy of specific performance,
while the buyer, as a practical and customary matter, can avail him
or herself of that remedy.
43. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 1981).
“[T]he agreement must be sufficiently certain and complete in its essential terms
that ordinarily specific performance will lie.” Id.
44. See id. at 122-23.
45. Id. at 121.
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One must then ask why the absence of mutuality of the remedy
of specific performance precludes the applicability of the statute
when the purpose of applying the requirement of statutory
termination is to reflect the buyer’s right to specific performance
under the doctrine of equitable conversion. Perhaps the answer is
that what is “good for the goose is good for the gander.” Buyers
should not have the protection of the termination statute if they
are not also at risk for a claim of specific performance by the seller
46
if they fail to perform.
Regardless of the policy issues, in 1985, as part of a general rewrite of the cancellation statute, the legislature essentially codified
the Romain case and the applicability of section 559.21 to purchase
47
agreements. In an amendment to section 559.21, the legislature
recognized both the difference between purchase agreements and
contracts for deed and the Romain rule for determining the
48
applicability of the statute to purchase agreements. In particular,
the legislature modified the cancellation statute to provide that
earnest money contracts, purchase agreements, and exercised
options “that are subject to” section 559.21 may be terminated with
a thirty-day notice (unless by their terms they provide for a longer
termination period), rather than with the customary sixty-day
49
notice applicable to traditional contracts for deed. Application of
a minimum thirty-day notice period to earnest money contracts,
purchase agreements, and exercised options reflects the lesser
equities applicable to a defaulting purchase agreement buyer, as
contrasted with a defaulting contract for deed buyer. More
importantly, for the issues presented here, the statute’s reference
to purchase agreements (or earnest money contracts or exercised
46. Also, in the case of a contingent purchase agreement, a buyer is typically
not risking the earnest money while the contingency is outstanding. Therefore, it
might be reasoned that until a buyer’s earnest money is at risk of forfeiture, that is,
until the contingency is satisfied (or waived), a buyer has not “paid” for the right
to require statutory termination.
47. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002).
48. Id.
49. Id. The reference to “exercised” options is a recognition that while an
unexercised option is not subject to the statute, an exercised option may be. In re
Hilltop Dev. Miller Hill Manor Co., 342 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1984). The postRomain legislation also revised the statutorily required notice in section 559.21,
subdivision 3, to refer to “your contract for the purchase of your property,” in lieu
of the prior reference to “your contract for deed.” MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd.
4(a). The earlier verbiage was relied upon by the sellers in Romain for their
argument that the statute did not apply to purchase agreements. Romain, 310
N.W.2d at 121.
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options) “that are subject to” the termination statute was an
unmistakable recognition that the Romain rule makes only definite,
50
non-contingent purchase agreements subject to section 559.21.
Furthermore, the caveat was needed so as to avoid any implication
that the legislature intended to either abandon the Romain rule or
to make the statute applicable to all purchase agreements.
C. Problems with Romain
The primary problem with the Romain test is that it lacks
certainty. It may not be easy to determine whether a particular
purchase agreement meets the Romain requirements of
definiteness and non-contingency. The court itself recognized this
when it concluded that the decision leaves “some uncertainty in the
application of section 559.21, which the prudent counselor will
51
have to take into account.” This is particularly a problem where
the question is the existence of an unsatisfied contingency.
Without statutory termination there always remains the risk that the
buyer will satisfy an outstanding contingency, such as financing or
rezoning, and will then acquire an equitable interest that must be
statutorily terminated. In fact, unless the purchase agreement
specifically requires that the buyer provide written notice (or
evidence) that the particular contingency has been satisfied, a
seller may not even be aware of whether or not the contingency has
been met. Moreover, most contingencies, such as financing,
inspection, and land use approvals, can be waived by the buyer; a
waived contingency is no longer a contingency that will prevent the
application of the termination statute.
A buyer under a contingent purchase agreement who is unable
to timely close may voluntarily waive all contingencies (other than
title). The effect of waiving all contingencies will be to make
section 559.21 applicable to the defaulted purchase agreement and
trigger a need for the seller to serve the thirty-day cancellation
notice, which will assure the buyer an additional minimum thirty
days to close after seller serves the statutory notice of termination.
Thus, even if the purchase agreement was originally not subject to
section 559.21 due to a contingency, and even if the event (such as
financing or rezoning) that is the subject of the contingency has
not occurred, a buyer might unilaterally transform the purchase
50.
51.

See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a).
Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 123.
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agreement into an agreement that is subject to (and requires)
52
statutory termination.
The risk of ignoring (or incorrectly applying) Romain can be
devastating to a seller. In the situation of a “busted” transaction, a
seller might elect (either out of ignorance or out of a mistaken
belief that the purchase agreement did not meet the Romain test)
not to serve the section 559.21 notice of termination. Believing
that the first purchase agreement is no longer effective, the seller
may then enter into a second purchase agreement that is not
subject to cancellation of the first purchase agreement. If,
however, the believed-to-be-dead first purchase agreement rises up
(by means of an action for specific performance by the first buyer),
the result is that the seller will be caught between the proverbial
rock and a hard place. The seller cannot close on either the first or
the second purchase agreements. The filing of a lis pendens by the
first purchaser will create a cloud on title that prevents closing on
the sale to the second purchaser. Likewise, if the seller seeks to
close with the first purchaser, that closing will be unsuccessful since
the seller will have to disclose under the customary seller’s affidavit
that the seller has entered into a second purchase agreement. The
end result will likely be that both the first purchaser and the second
purchaser will successfully sue the seller for selling the same
property twice.
Therefore, as a matter of prudence, if there is any uncertainty
regarding the application of Romain to a particular purchase
agreement, in the absence of a quitclaim deed or other consensual
termination from the buyer on a “busted” sale, a well-advised seller
will use statutory termination. Service of the section 559.21 notice
will give a tardy, and perhaps undeserving buyer an additional
53
thirty days to close.
Nevertheless, the risks of ignoring or
52. The buyer’s waiver of the contingency will normally result in the buyer’s
earnest money being retained by the seller in the event that the buyer does not
close after service of the statutory notice of termination. In effect, the buyer will
have risked the otherwise refundable earnest money as the price of getting the
additional thirty days to close. That is often small comfort to a seller more
concerned about remarketing the property than retaining what is often a small
earnest money deposit.
53. One might consider adding a proviso to the notice of cancellation that
the notice is being given without prejudice to the seller’s right to claim that no
notice is required. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Murray v.
Nickerson, held that the seller could not have it both ways and that the seller giving
the statutory notice was sufficient for the court to conclude that the parties treated
the agreement as more than an option. 90 Minn. 197, 202-03, 95 N.W. 898, 900
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incorrectly applying Romain are such that the benefits of certainty
outweigh the costs of unnecessarily providing the statutory notice.
Aside from general concerns about uncertainty in the
application of section 559.21 to purchase agreements, particular
concerns have been expressed regarding the applicability of section
559.21 to residential purchase agreements. Despite the shortened
cure period allowed for purchase agreements, many residential
brokers have believed that the statutory scheme did not adequately
address the problems all too often experienced in “busted”
residential real estate transactions. Transactions typically fail either
because the seller or the buyer would choose to back out and
thereby breach the agreement, or a contingency, typically for
financing or inspection, would not be timely fulfilled. In most
situations, the seller and buyer would simply sign a cancellation
agreement (as typically required by the form purchase agreement)
that directs to whom the broker was to deliver the earnest money.
However, brokers reported that too often either or both the
parties would refuse to sign the cancellation agreement. As a
result, in the case of buyer recalcitrance, (a) the seller would face
the uncertainty of whether, due to contingencies, a section 559.21
termination was even required and how to secure the earnest
money, or (b) if it was determined that statutory termination was
required or desirable, the seller would face at least a thirty-day
delay in waiting out the cure period before receiving the earnest
money and putting the house back on the market.
Also, section 559.21 is only a remedy available to sellers and
does not assist a buyer in the case of seller recalcitrance. If either
the seller defaulted or the purchase agreement failed by reason of a
contingency and the seller was unwilling to refund the earnest
money to the buyer, a buyer had no extra-judicial remedy to
determine that the purchase agreement was terminated and that
the buyer was entitled to the earnest money. Thus, in the case of
seller recalcitrance, a buyer was invariably required to go to court
to seek judicial relief (often over a relatively small sum of money).
Furthermore, section 559.21 is only available in the case of
default (and only the buyer’s default at that) and no procedure is
available where a purchase agreement fails by reason of an
unfulfilled condition.
If, for example, a buyer’s financing
condition is not timely fulfilled, a seller could not immediately
(1903).
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commence a section 559.21 proceeding, but rather, could only
serve a statutory notice when the buyer actually went into default.
Finally, in the case of either seller or buyer recalcitrance,
absent a section 559.21 termination or a court order, brokers
holding the earnest money had no mechanism upon which they
could rely to determine to whom the money should go. Without
going through the thirty-plus day section 559.21 procedure (or if
section 559.21 was believed inapplicable), a broker holding earnest
money would face potential liability by disbursing the earnest
money to the wrong party or would simply have to hold the money
until the parties went to court.
II. NEW CANCELLATION LEGISLATION
As a result of those concerns, the Minnesota legislature
responded and adopted, as alternatives to termination under
section 559.21, two new cancellation procedures for residential
purchase agreements: cancellation with right to cure and
54
declaratory cancellation.
These new procedures apply only to
purchase agreements for residential real property entered into on
55
or after August 1, 2004. Residential real property is defined as
“real property, including vacant land, occupied by, or intended to
54. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 203, art. I, §§ 9-10. For ease of reference, citations to
the new legislation will refer to Minnesota Statutes section 559.217 (2004) to
which the new legislation is to be codified. As discussed infra, the new section’s
title, “Declaratory Cancellation of Purchase Agreement,” is something of a
misnomer in that section 559.217 provides for two new means of cancelling a
purchase agreement, only one of which deals with declaratory cancellation. MINN.
STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4 (2004). The other, cancellation with right to cure, does
not purport to declare or confirm a contract already cancelled, but, like section
559.21, provides a mechanism to cancel a purchase agreement that has not been
purportedly cancelled. Id. subd. 3. Also, as a matter of nomenclature, although
section 559.21 uses the words “terminate” and “termination,” section 559.217 uses
the terms “cancel” and “cancellation.” Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21 with MINN.
STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(b). In addition, section 559.217 refers to “suspension” of
the cancellation process, rather than enjoining or restraining the cancellation.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217.
55. Like the language authorizing a shortened thirty-day period for
termination under section 559.21, subdivision 4(a), the new legislation applies to
an “earnest money contract, purchase agreement, or exercised option” and goes
on to define a “purchase agreement” as any one of those instruments. MINN. STAT.
§ 559.217, subd. 1(b). Because section 559.217 uses the same terminology that
section 559.21 uses to distinguish such holding instruments from the other
instruments subject to section 559.21, that is, contracts for deed, it is clear that
section 559.217 does not apply to contracts for deed. There is, however, no strict
statutory definition of what is or is not a contract for deed.
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56

be occupied by, one to four families as their residence.” There
are no dollar limits on the purchase agreements subject to the new
57
legislation; it covers all residential purchase agreements.
A. Cancellation With Right to Cure
Of the two, the cancellation with right to cure procedure is
58
more similar to section 559.21. It may be used where a default has
occurred or an unfulfilled condition exists after the date specified
for fulfillment under a residential purchase agreement, which
59
“does not by its terms” cancel the purchase agreement. Under
that procedure, a party may serve a fifteen-day notice on the other
60
party and any third party holding the earnest money.
The
contract is then cancelled if the party upon whom notice is served
does not, within fifteen days of service, either (a) comply with the
conditions in default and complete the unfulfilled conditions,
including, if applicable, completion of the purchase or sale or (b)
61
secure a court order suspending the cancellation.
B. Declaratory Cancellation
The second procedure, declaratory cancellation, may be used
where a default has occurred or an unfulfilled condition exists after
the date specified for fulfillment under a residential purchase
agreement, which does “by the terms of the purchase agreement”
62
cancel the purchase agreement. Under that procedure, a party
may serve a fifteen-day notice on the other party and any third
party holding the earnest money, and the contract is cancelled if
the party upon whom notice is served does not, within the fifteen
56. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(c). If the seller resides on the property, it
would presumably qualify as residential even if the buyer did not intend to occupy
it as residential. See id. If not already residential, however, it is presumably the
intent of the buyer, not the seller, that matters. Thus, property not occupied as
residential by a seller would be deemed “residential” as long as the buyer intended
to occupy the property as residential. Query: What if the buyer under the
purchase agreement is buying vacant land to construct a residence to be sold to a
subsequent owner-occupant? What if the buyer is a developer or speculator who
will sell to that builder?
57. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(c).
58. Id. subd. 3.
59. Id. subd. 3(a).
60. Id. subd. 3(b)-(c).
61. Id.
62. Id. subd. 4(a). With respect to use of declaratory cancellation in the case
of a default, rather than an unfulfilled condition, see infra Part III.
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63

days, secure a court order suspending the cancellation.
In
contrast to cancellation with right to cure (and termination under
section 559.21), under declaratory cancellation, which merely seeks
to confirm a cancellation after-the-fact, there is no right to cure the
default or to satisfy the unfulfilled contingency.
C. Comparison to Section 559.21
In many respects, the new cancellation procedures are virtually
identical to those of section 559.21. For both cancellation with
right to cure and declaratory cancellation, service on the other
64
party must be made in the same manner as section 559.21, and
the statutorily specified forms of notice are similar, although not
65
In addition, like
identical, to the section 559.21 notice form.
section 559.21 terminations, cancellation under the two new
procedures cancels the contract, making it void and of no further
66
force or effect. Also, as under Minnesota Statutes section 559.213,
an affidavit reciting the cancellation and the failure to respond is
67
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Finally, injunctive
relief under Minnesota Statutes section 559.211 may be obtained by
68
the party served. Such action may be commenced by service on
63. Id. subds. 4(b)-(c).
64. Id. subds. 3(b), 4(b) (requiring that notice under both cancellation with
right to cure and declaratory cancellation must be served in the manner provided
in section 559.21, subdivisions 4(a) and (b)).
65. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 3 (2002) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217,
subd. 5. Although cancellation with right to cure under section 559.217,
subdivision 3(a)(3), requires that the notice state the purchase agreement will be
cancelled unless the party served “complies with the conditions in default and
completes the unfulfilled conditions,” the corresponding cancellation with right to
cure notice under section 559.217, subdivision 5(a), only references the buyer
having “fully complied with all of your obligations under the purchase agreement”
and does not reference completing the unfulfilled conditions. MINN. STAT. §
559.217, subds. 3, 5.
66. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(d) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217,
subds. 3(c), 4(c).
67. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.213 with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 7(a)(c).
68. The statute authorizing issuance of an injunction staying a notice of
termination, Minnesota Statutes section 559.211, subdivision 1, which was not
amended by the 2004 legislation, provides that a court has authority to enjoin or
restrain proceedings to effectuate a termination of a contract for the conveyance
of real estate “notwithstanding the service or publication pursuant to the
provisions of section 559.21 of a notice of termination of the contract” and does
not mention section 559.217. MINN. STAT. § 559.211, subd. 1 (2002). The absence
of any reference to section 559.217 in the injunction statute should probably not
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69

the attorney for the party serving the cancellation.
However, the new cancellation procedures vary from section
559.21 in important respects. Obviously, the fifteen-day period is
half the typical thirty-day period under a section 559.21 purchase
70
agreement termination.
Also, in a provision not found in the
injunction statute applicable to section 559.21 terminations, if an
injunctive action to suspend the cancellation under either of these
new proceedings is brought, the court “shall” award filing fees,
service costs, and attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an
71
amount not to exceed $3,000. In addition, upon completion of a
cancellation under the new procedures, earnest money expressly
becomes the property of the party initiating the cancellation and a
broker is expressly authorized to release the money to that party
upon receipt of an affidavit regarding the completed cancellation
72
proceeding.
Furthermore, unlike section 559.21, which is only
available in the event of a default, the new procedures are also
available when there is merely a failure to timely satisfy a
73
condition. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unlike section
559.21, which is only available to a seller, the new cancellation
procedures may be used (and notice initiated) by either a buyer or
74
a seller.
D. Counter-Cancellations
Due to this final variation, allowing for initiation of
be read as precluding the application of the injunction statute to section 559.217
proceedings because (a) section 559.211 applies to any “contract for the
conveyance of real estate;” (b) section 559.217, subdivision 6, which authorizes an
award of attorneys fees and costs in connection with any proceeding “to suspend
the cancellation of a purchase agreement” under section 559.217, clearly envisions
that a proceeding under section 559.217 may be suspended or enjoined in the
manner provided in section 559.211; and (c) section 559.217, subdivision 8,
authorizes service of process on the attorney initiating the cancellation in
connection with an action to “restrain the cancellation.” See MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21,
.211, subd. 1, .217. It is noteworthy that, even if section 559.211 applies to a section
559.217 proceeding, section 559.211 seems to contemplate an injunction sought
by a buyer against the seller, but does not appear to contemplate an action by a
seller to enjoin a cancellation by a buyer under section 559.217 (which has no
counterpart under section 559.21). See MINN. STAT. § 559.211.
69. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 8 with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 8.
70. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 3-4.
71. Id. subd. 6.
72. Id. subd. 7(d).
73. Id. subds. 3(a), 4(a).
74. Id. subd. 2.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 12
12WERTHEIM

704

3/29/2005 2:52:42 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

cancellation by either a seller or a buyer, the legislation of necessity
addresses the situation where both parties initiate cancellation by
75
serving the other with notice, that is, dueling cancellations. Thus,
when one party is served with a notice of cancellation under either
procedure, if the served party serves a counter-cancellation within
the time period allowed by the first cancellation, the effect of the
second service is to automatically and immediately cancel the
76
In such event, the broker holding the
purchase agreement.
earnest money has no authority to disburse the proceeds and the
issue of who is entitled to the earnest money must be decided in a
77
judicial action.
In such a proceeding following a counter-cancellation, the
court is authorized to make a determination without regard to
78
which party first initiated a cancellation proceeding. In addition,
the court is granted express authority to “consider the terms of the
79
cancelled purchase agreement in making its determination.” This
last provision is significant given the longstanding rule in
Minnesota that statutory cancellation of a contract removes any
claim that a buyer otherwise might assert to recover payments made
under the contract and that the parties are, in effect, placed in the
80
position as if the contract had never existed in the first place.
Despite the fact that counter-cancellation will have the effect of
cancelling the purchase agreement, the legislation specifically
overrides this prior case law that would have precluded the court
75. The initial proposed legislation did not address the situation where a
second party serves a section 559.217 notice after the first party does so. H.F.
2439, 83rd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2004); S.F. 2379, 83rd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).
Application of the rule that the party who initiates and completes a cancellation is
entitled to the earnest money to the situation of competing cancellation
proceedings by both the seller and the buyer would, however, inevitably place
conflicting obligations on the holder of the earnest money to tender the earnest
money to both parties. The bill was subsequently amended to address competing
cancellations and provide for special rules in such a case. See S. Journal, 83rd Leg.
Sess., at 3052-53 (Minn. Mar. 25, 2004) (adopting amendments to S.F. 2379).
76. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 2. An affidavit regarding the service of the
two cancellations is prima facie evidence of the cancellation of the purchase
agreement. Id. subd. 7(e).
77. Id. subd. 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 218, 101 N.W.2d 213, 224
(1960); Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 355, 180 N.W. 227,
228 (1920); Olson v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 229, 233-34, 148 N.W. 67, 69
(1914); Nowicki v. Benson Prop., 402 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that breach of contract claim is not allowed after statutory cancellation).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/12

18

Wertheim: Minnesota’s New Residential Purchase Agreement Cancellation Statu
12WERTHEIM

2004]

3/29/2005 2:52:42 PM

RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE CANCELLATION

705

from considering the terms of the cancelled purchase agreement in
making its determination of who is entitled to the earnest money.
III. ROMAIN AND THE NEW LEGISLATION
The distinction in the two new procedures between a purchase
agreement which does or does not cancel “by its terms” is not, on
its face, the same as the Romain test under section 559.21. Under
Romain, the issue is whether the agreement is definite and noncontingent, and if so, statutory termination under section 559.21 is
required notwithstanding the fact that the contract purports to
81
automatically terminate by its own terms upon the buyer’s default.
It should be noted at the outset that the new legislation does
provide for cancellation procedures for purchase agreements
which would clearly not meet the Romain test, that is, would not
82
require statutory termination under section 559.21. Declaratory
cancellation will typically apply where, due to failure to satisfy a
condition, such as financing or inspection, the agreement is
83
automatically cancelled “by the terms of the purchase agreement.”
Such a contingent agreement would not meet the Romain test and,
due to the absence of any default, could not be terminated under
section 559.21 by a seller. Declaratory cancellation would, however,
allow either a seller or a buyer to initiate a proceeding to confirm
such cancellation and, upon completion, have a means of
84
evidencing such cancellation and the right to the earnest money.
In addition, cancellation with right to cure also applies to a
purchase agreement which has failed due to failure of a condition
85
but does not “by its terms” automatically cancel.
Such a
contingent purchase agreement would also not meet the Romain
test requiring statutory termination and, due to the absence of any
default, would not be terminable by the seller under section
86
559.21. Such a contract can now, however, be cancelled by either
the seller or the buyer under the new cancellation with right to
87
cure procedure.
Use of cancellation with right to cure for a

81.
1981).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Minn.
MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. subd. 3(a).
See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002).
MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 3(a).
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contingent purchase agreement is likely to arise in situations where
there is a contingency, but, usually due to poor drafting, the parties
have failed to set out the consequences of the failure to fulfill (or
waive) that contingency—that the agreement is to become null and
88
void. Thus, with respect to both cancellation with right to cure
and declaratory cancellation, the new legislation provides for
cancellation procedures for a purchase agreement that not only
would not need to be cancelled under Romain, but, in fact, could
not be cancelled under section 559.21 due to the absence of a
default.
In addition to dealing with non-Romain purchase agreements,
the new legislation purports to permit declaratory cancellation,
that is, confirmation of cancellation without a right to cure, if a
default occurs “which by the terms of the purchase agreement cancels the
89
purchase agreement.”
Does the new legislation validate
declaratory cancellation, without an opportunity to cure after
notice, of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, despite
the fact that under Romain, notice and an opportunity to cure
under section 559.21 would be required? In other words, can an
ipso facto clause declaring that a purchase agreement becomes null
and void automatically upon a default by the buyer (or seller) be
enforced as written?
The new legislation would arguably appear to recognize the
declaratory cancellation of a residential purchase agreement by
means of an ipso facto clause which provides that on default
(presumably by the buyer), the purchase agreement is
automatically null and void. The new legislation does not
reference the Romain test of definiteness and absence of
contingencies. Moreover, its express distinction between purchase
agreements which do or do not cancel by their terms is arguably
inconsistent with the teaching of Romain that section 559.21 “is not
dependent on how the parties may have manipulated the contract
90
language.”
Furthermore, Romain is, strictly speaking, an
interpretation of, or gloss on, section 559.21, not a pronouncement
of the pure common law. As such, its continued applicability is

88. Careful evaluation in such situation should be made of the need to do a
cancellation with right to cure, however, since in contrast to declaratory
cancellation, the former procedure will permit the served party a fifteen-day
period to satisfy the condition after the date specified for fulfillment.
89. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added).
90. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 1981).
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entirely within the control of the legislature and the legislature
could, if it wished, overrule or limit Romain. Under that theory, the
new legislation, in effect, has declared Romain inapplicable and
permits ipso facto termination clauses for default in definite, noncontingent, residential purchase agreements confirmed by a
declaratory cancellation.
Nevertheless, there are strong indications that the new
legislation did not intend to change the teachings of Romain and
permit the declaratory cancellation of definite, non-contingent
residential purchase agreements immediately upon a default
without notice and opportunity to cure. First, the existing
termination statute, section 559.21, subdivision 4(a), including its
prohibition on any waiver of the notice required by section 559.21,
was amended by the 2004 law to read as follows:
The notice required by the section must be given
notwithstanding any provisions in the contract to the
contrary, except that earnest money contracts, purchase
agreements, and exercised options that are subject to this
section may . . . be terminated on 30 days’ notice, or may be
91
cancelled under section 559.217.
As previously noted, the reference to contracts “that are
subject to this section” is the language previously adopted by the
92
The
legislature to reflect and incorporate the Romain test.
continued use of that phrase with reference to purchase
93
agreements that “may be cancelled under section 559.217”
indicates that the adoption of section 559.217 was not intended to
repeal or nullify Romain.
Also, the allowance of cancellation under section 559.217 is
deemed another alternative to the sixty-day termination under
section 559.21, just like the shortened thirty-day notice period for
purchase agreements terminated under section 559.21. Under that
view, just as the Romain rule and the prohibition of contractual
waiver of notice and cure rights are to be applied in the case of
definite, non-contingent purchase agreements terminated under
section 559.21, Romain and the prohibition of contractual waiver of
notice and cure rights are to be applied to cancellation of definite,
non-contingent residential purchase agreements under section
559.217.
91.
92.
93.

2004 Minn. Laws ch. 203, § 9 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
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Second, “purchase agreements” under section 559.217 are
defined as those instruments “that could be cancelled under”
section 559.21, providing a further basis to conclude that the new
legislation did not intend to reject the Romain rule as it applied to
94
cancellations under section 559.217.
Third, if the new legislation intended to make Romain
inapplicable to the new procedures, it does not seem that it would
have distinguished, as Romain does, between purchase agreements
in which notice and right to cure are required, for which
cancellation with right to cure must be used, and those purchase
agreements in which no right to cure is required and for which
95
declaratory cancellation can be used. In fact, as discussed more
fully infra, the distinction between purchase agreements which do
cancel by their own terms and purchase agreements which do not
cancel by their own terms is largely only explicable with reference
96
to Romain. Purchase agreements which do cancel by their own
97
terms do so because Romain does not require otherwise. Purchase
agreements which do not cancel by their own terms, however, do
not cancel not because the contract terms state they do not cancel,
but because of the extra-contractual, legal doctrine known as
98
Romain.
Romain dictates that such definite, non-contingent
purchase agreements cannot cancel upon default without resort to
99
the statutory cancellation procedure. Since the very distinction
between purchase agreements that must be cancelled with a right
to cure and purchase agreements for which declaratory
cancellation applies is itself largely premised on the ongoing
existence of the Romain doctrine, it makes little sense that the new
legislation would intend to overrule Romain.
Fourth, the conclusion that the legislature has rejected Romain
would have serious implications for the ancient doctrine of
100
equitable conversion.
Under the doctrine of equitable
94. MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002), 559.217, subd. 1(b). Those
limitations cannot, however, be read too literally since, as noted supra, contingent
purchase agreements failing by reason of unfulfilled promises are not subject to
section 559.21 and could not be cancelled under section 559.21, but can be the
subject of both declaratory cancellation and cancellation with right to cure.
95. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 3, 4.
96. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
97. See Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Minn.
1981).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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conversion, a buyer under a definite, non-contingent purchase
agreement will have acquired a property interest. If declaratory
cancellation is read as recognizing confirmation of the cancellation
by means of an ipso facto default clause, without notice and right to
cure, in the case of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement,
the equitable conversion doctrine has been eviscerated beyond
recognition.
Fifth, as the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, the
predecessor to section 559.21 was adopted a hundred years ago in
“[r]eaction against the common-law rule permitting forfeiture
without notice” and to “ameliorate the harsh rule of the common
101
law.”
It would make little sense to read the new legislation as
reinstating the harsh situation under the common law that section
559.21 was adopted to ameliorate over a hundred years ago.
Finally, because Romain clearly still applies to non-residential
purchase agreements which still must be terminated under section
559.21, it makes little sense that the legislature intended that
buyers under definite, non-contingent residential purchase
agreements have less protection than the typically more
sophisticated buyers (including developers) under similar nonresidential purchase agreements.
Based upon this analysis, while the matter is not free from
doubt, it appears that Romain remains applicable to the new
legislation and declaratory cancellation only provides a means of
confirming a cancellation which, under Romain, has otherwise
taken effect. In other words, the new legislation should be read to
provide that only in the case of contingent or indefinite purchase
agreements should ipso facto cancellations (based upon default or
otherwise) be recognized under declaratory cancellation.
Conversely, declaratory cancellation does not validate cancellation
without an opportunity to cure a definite, non-contingent purchase
agreement, even if the contract purports, by its own express terms,
to provide for immediate, automatic cancellation upon a default.
As a result, under this view of the new legislation, only cancellation
with right to cure can be used upon a default to cancel a definite,
non-contingent residential purchase agreement.
These
conclusions should apply to cancellation by a buyer, as well as a
seller, of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement,
101. Jandric v. Skahen, 235 Minn. 256, 260, 50 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1951)
(quoting Graceville State Bank. v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 62, 206 N.W. 948, 949
(1926)).
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notwithstanding any automatic default clause.
IV. CANCELLATION “BY ITS TERMS” BASED UPON AN UNFUFILLED
CONDITION
As previously outlined, section 559.217 should be read,
consistent with Romain, to provide that a definite, non-contingent
purchase agreement does not cancel “by its terms” upon a default
and, in such a case, cancellation with right to cure is required.
There is, however, a separate, albeit related, issue regarding the
application of declaratory cancellation in the case of unfulfilled
conditions. Specifically, what does it mean for a contingent
purchase agreement to be cancelled “by its terms”?
As previously noted, the difference between declaratory
cancellation and cancellation with right to cure in the context of an
unfulfilled condition is that the former applies if the existence of
the unfulfilled condition cancels the purchase agreement “by the
102
terms of the purchase agreement” and the latter applies if the
existence of the unfulfilled condition “does not by its terms” cancel
103
The legislation itself does not provide
the purchase agreement.
any real guidance on what provisions in a purchase agreement
qualify the purchase agreement for declaratory cancellation.
One purchase agreement would appear to clearly qualify for
declaratory cancellation had it been subject to the new statute—
104
that is the purchase agreement involved in Romain.
That
purchase agreement provided that if the parties were unable to
agree upon collateral for the buyer’s obligation satisfactory to the
105
seller, the purchase agreement would be null and void. Since the
parties were unable to agree on that collateral, the purchase
agreement became null and void “by the terms of the purchase
106
agreement.”
As a result, had the contract in Romain involved
residential property and been entered into after August 1, 2004,
either seller or buyer could have commenced a declaratory
cancellation proceeding under section 559.217 to confirm that the
agreement had, in fact, been cancelled. Beyond that case, however,
it is less clear the reach of declaratory cancellation.
Purchase agreements frequently provide that a party has the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a).
Id. subd. 3(a).
See Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 119.
Id.
Id.
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right or option to cancel (or declare a cancellation of) the
purchase agreement upon some event, for example, failure to
procure financing or failure to evidence good title. Upon exercise
of that right or option by that party, the purchase agreement is
cancelled (or null and void). One might argue that because the
“terms” of such purchase agreement purport to provide that the
purchase agreement is “cancelled,” such a purchase agreement
cancels “by its terms” and hence, qualifies for declaratory
cancellation. The problem with that approach is twofold.
First, if the test of whether a purchase agreement does or does
not cancel “by its terms” is whether the purchase agreement is
cancelable, that is, the seller or the buyer has the right to cancel
(or declare the purchase agreement cancelled or declare the
purchase agreement null and void), virtually all purchase
agreement conditions will satisfy that test. Only a purchase
agreement containing the most poorly drafted contingency
provision will not cancel “by its terms”—one which does not
indicate that upon the happening (or non-happening) of such
contingency, one or both of the parties has the right to cancel the
purchase agreement. Thus, if grant of a right to cancel means that
a purchase agreement cancels “by the terms of the purchase
agreement,” few purchase agreements will not qualify.
Second, the statutory language for declaratory cancellation
refers to the situation where an “unfulfilled condition exists . . . in
the terms of a purchase agreement . . . which by the terms of the
107
purchase agreement cancels the purchase agreement.” Although
the word “which” follows “purchase agreement,” the reference is to
108
the fact that an “unfulfilled condition exists.” In other words, it is
the existence of the unfulfilled condition that is causing the
109
cancellation of the purchase agreement.
If it is the mere
existence of the unfulfilled condition that must cause the
cancellation of the purchase agreement, then it is hard to say that a
purchase agreement which gives the buyer or seller the right or
option to terminate the purchase agreement qualifies for
107. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a). The counterpart language for a
cancellation with right to cure similarly refers to the situation where an
“unfulfilled condition exists . . . in the terms of a purchase agreement . . . which
does not by its terms cancel the purchase agreement.” Id. subd. 3(a).
108. Id.
109. Also, it would not make linguistic sense to say that it is the purchase
agreement “which by the terms of the purchase agreement cancels the purchase
agreement.”
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declaratory cancellation. The reference to cancellation “by its
terms” or “by the terms of the purchase agreement” suggests that it
must be the terms of the purchase agreement themselves that
effectuate the cancellation and not any action or election of the
110
seller or buyer.
In that view, it is the existence of the unfulfilled condition, not
the election of the party to cancel (or declare a cancellation), that
causes the purchase agreement to cancel by its own terms. Thus,
under this interpretation, it is only a condition that automatically,
ipso facto, causes the termination of the purchase agreement that
meets the declaratory cancellation test. Under that construction,
only if the unfulfilled condition automatically cancels the purchase
agreement, without the need for any action or election by the seller
or buyer, will the purchase agreement qualify for declaratory
111
cancellation.
The real problem is that the whole distinction between
purchase agreements which do or do not cancel by their own terms
is that such a distinction is not one familiar to modern Minnesota
real estate law with one notable exception. The substantive rights
of the parties have generally not been affected by whether the
“terms” of a purchase agreement do or do not provide that the
purchase agreement cancels or is terminated “by its terms” upon a
default or an unfulfilled condition. As noted supra, the distinction
between purchase agreements which do or do not terminate by
their “terms” is not a function of the precise language in the
purchase agreements and whether or not they expressly state that
upon a default or upon the non-occurrence of a particular
condition, the purchase agreement will cancel, terminate, or
112
become null and void.
Rather, in Minnesota the distinction is
really only a function of the applicability of an extra-contractual
113
legal doctrine, Romain.
Romain provides that, regardless of
110. It is noteworthy that all the purchase agreements in the cases cited in
Romain, both those involving defaults to which section 559.21 was held to apply
and those involving contingencies to which section 559.21 was held not to apply,
all contained automatic, ipso facto termination provisions. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at
121-22.
111. If only an automatic, ipso facto cancellation qualifies for declaratory
cancellation, then a clause which provided for automatic cancellation, but with a
provision that such cancellation may be avoided or waived by the election of one
of the parties, would not appear to qualify because it is functionally equivalent to a
right to cancel (or declare a cancellation) upon the contingency.
112. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113. Romain, 310 N.W.2d 118.
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whether the particular “terms” of a purchase agreement purport to
automatically cancel the purchase agreement upon a default, a
definite, non-contingent purchase agreement will not cancel “by its
terms” but will require cancellation pursuant to the statutory
114
cancellation procedure.
In other words, whether a purchase
agreement cancels “by its terms” is not dependent on the terms of
the purchase agreement and what it says about cancellation, but
the application of the Romain doctrine to the purchase agreement
115
as a whole.
By drawing the distinction based upon the applicability of an
extra-contractual doctrine, section 559.217 paradoxically applies an
analysis of a purchase agreement based upon the effect that
another statute, section 559.21, would have on a particular
purchase agreement, despite the fact that section 559.217 is an
alternative to section 559.21 and the particular purchase
agreement is not being terminated under section 559.21. This
conceptual difficulty is further complicated by the fact that both
cancellation with right to cure and declaratory cancellation under
section 559.217 are available in the case of cancellation by reason
of an unfulfilled condition. The new legislation draws the
distinction between purchase agreements which do or do not
116
cancel by their own “terms” as a result of an unfulfilled condition.
Yet the Romain doctrine has absolutely no applicability to
contingent purchase agreements and so it is hard to see how
Romain can provide any guidance on that score.
Thus, the whole distinction between purchase agreements
which do or do not cancel by their own “terms” may be
theoretically suspect. On the one hand, it is hard to place much
weight on the distinction of whether a purchase agreement
automatically does or does not cancel without an election by one of
the parties. Whether the cancellation is automatic or whether a
party must elect to cancel would not appear to justify disparate
treatment under section 559.217. On the other hand, the Romain
doctrine provides no traction in analyzing the distinction between
self-cancelling and non-self-cancelling agreements in the context of
unfulfilled conditions.
114. Id.
115. In Romain, the court, in discussing the contingent purchase agreement in
Joslyn v. Schwend, 85 Minn. 130, 88 N.W. 410 (1901), noted that in that case the
purchase agreement ended “by its terms.” Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121.
116. MINN. STAT. § 559.217 (2004).
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The recently revised residential purchase agreement form
adopted by the Minnesota Association of Realtors provides some
117
instruction on this point.
The realtors’ form is very commonly
used in Minnesota residential transactions and almost always used
118
The purchase agreement form
where a broker is involved.
attempts to address the issue of when declaratory cancellation may
be used. The default provision, revised to reflect section 559.217,
provides as follows:
[I]f either Buyer or Seller defaults in any of the
agreements hereunder or there exists an unfulfilled
condition after the date specified for fulfillment, either
party may cancel this Purchase Agreement under MN
Statute 559.217, Subd. 3. Whenever it is provided herein
that the Purchase Agreement is cancelled, said language
shall be deemed a provision authorizing a Declaratory
119
Cancellation under MN Statute 559.217, Subd. 4.
Thus, this form indicates that the parties are to use cancellation
with right to cure in any case where there is a default or unfulfilled
condition, but declaratory cancellation can be used only where the
120
agreement provides that the agreement “is cancelled.”
From this language one might speculate that this form
purchase agreement draws a distinction between situations where
cancellation is at the option of one of the parties, in which case
cancellation with right to cure must be used, and situations where
upon the happening or non-happening of an event, cancellation
occurs automatically without any election or option of the parties
(“is cancelled”), in which case declaratory cancellation may be
used. In fact, a number of provisions in this form purchase
agreement provide that, upon the non-fulfillment of a condition,
the purchase agreement “is cancelled” automatically, without either
party exercising any option or election. Thus, if the condition is
not timely fulfilled, the form provides that the purchase agreement
“is cancelled” without any requirement that either party exercise
121
any election or option.
This requirement is found in the
provision dealing with cancellation of a previously written purchase
122
agreement (with a third party buyer), under the Contingency
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004).
Id.
Id. at lines 116-119 (emphasis added).
See id.
See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines
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123

Addendum dealing with buyer’s sale of his existing residence, in
124
one of the formulations of the Financing Addendum, and in one
125
of the provisions dealing with the buyer’s inspection contingency.
However, a second group of provisions in the purchase
agreement form, dealing with conditions, provides that nonfulfillment of a condition of the purchase agreement does not
result in cancellation of the purchase agreement unless and until
126
Yet, even though the
one of the parties elects to cancel.
purported cancellation is not automatic, the form still recites that
127
the purchase agreement is cancelled.
Thus, in the provision
128
dealing with post-agreement special assessments, in the provision
129
dealing with the inability of the seller to provide marketable title,
130
in the provision addressing a casualty loss, in another formulation
131
of the financing contingency, and in another provision dealing
132
with the buyer’s inspection contingency, non-fulfillment of the
32-35. If cancellation of the prior purchase agreement with a third party is not
obtained by the specified date, the subject purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
123. See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519N: CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM (2004),
lines 12-13, 17-18. If the buyer fails to enter into a purchase agreement for an
existing residence by a specified date (or provide satisfactory evidence to the seller
of the buyer’s ability to close the purchase without the sale of the buyer’s
property), the subject purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
124. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519B: FINANCING ADDENDUM CONVENTIONAL OR
PRIVATELY INSURED CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE (2004), line 16. If the buyer cannot
secure a financing commitment, the purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
125. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519INSP: INSPECTION CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM
(2004), lines 32-34. If, after conducting an inspection, the buyer notifies the seller
of defects and the parties have not agreed on who will do or pay for repairs, the
purchase agreement “is cancelled without further notice required.” Id.
126. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
128. MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 5862. If a notice of special assessment is received after entering into the purchase
agreement, either party “may” declare the purchase agreement cancelled, in
which case the purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
129. Id. at lines 82-84. If the seller cannot provide marketable title, either
party “may” declare the purchase agreement cancelled by notice, in which case the
purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
130. Id. at lines 102-104. If there is a casualty destroying or substantially
damaging the property, the purchase agreement, “is cancelled, at Buyer’s option.”
Id.
131. MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519B: FINANCING ADDENDUM CONVENTIONAL OR
PRIVATELY INSURED CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE (2004), lines 21-25, 32-36. If the
buyer fails to provide evidence of financing by a specified date or if the agreement
does not close for any reason relating to financing, the seller “may, at Seller’s
option” declare the purchase agreement cancelled, in which case the purchase
agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
132. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519INSP: INSPECTION CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM
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condition does not automatically result in any consequences.
Rather, upon the election or option by one of the parties (along
with notice to the other party) following the non-fulfillment of the
condition, the form provides that the purchase agreement is
133
cancelled.
By using the code words “is cancelled,” the realtor’s
form contemplates the use of declaratory cancellation even though
cancellation only results from the option or election of one of the
parties.
The theory of the realtor’s purchase agreement form appears
to be that as long as the purchase agreement expressly states that in
a particular circumstance the agreement “is cancelled,” then it is
cancelled “by the terms of the purchase agreement” within the
meaning of section 559.217, subdivision 4, so as to qualify for
134
declaratory cancellation. This seems a questionable theory since,
under this approach, one could, contrary to Romain, draft a clause
which provides that upon any default the purchase agreement “is
cancelled” so as to permit declaratory cancellation of a non135
contingent purchase agreement without any cure period.
Moreover, this self-defining approach elevates form (use of the
code words “is cancelled”) over substance (the legal analysis of
whether the agreement, in fact, cancels “by the terms of the
purchase agreement”). In fact, it is tautological since, according to
this approach, an agreement cancels “by the terms of the purchase
agreement” under a particular circumstance if the agreement states
that it is cancelling by the terms of the purchase agreement (by use
136
of the code words “is cancelled”).
Nevertheless, given the
conceptual difficulty of ever articulating the theoretical
prerequisites for declaratory cancellation under the statute, there is
a reasonable likelihood that a court would accept the approach of
the realtor’s form and permit declaratory cancellation where the
(2004), lines 43-45. Notwithstanding any other provision, the buyer may cancel
the purchase agreement within a specified time after the inspection by notice, in
which case the purchase agreement “is cancelled.” Id.
133. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
134. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4 (2004).
135. The default section of the realtor’s form only authorizes termination
under section 559.21 or cancellation under section 559.217, subdivision 3, upon a
default and does not authorize declaratory cancellation upon a default.
MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 115-118.
136. Put another way, this theory contends that one of the “terms” of the
purchase agreement is the cancellation of the purchase agreement upon a
particular occurrence or non-occurrence, and therefore, the purchase agreement,
itself, cancels “by its terms.”
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form purchase agreement provides that the agreement cancels “by
its terms.”
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW LEGISLATION
A. Section 559.21 and Residential Purchase Agreements
The two new procedures are alternatives to section 559.21 so
that termination under section 559.21 of a residential purchase
137
agreement is still available, albeit only for a disgruntled seller.
Section 559.21 obviously has certain drawbacks for a seller in
comparison to the new procedures: it has a minimum thirty-day
cure period and cannot be used in the event of a mere failure of a
138
condition; it can only be based upon buyer default.
Section
559.21 does provide for a payment of the seller’s attorneys’ fees as a
condition to the buyer’s cure, but the amount is limited and can
only be claimed if the buyer has been in default for at least thirty
139
days prior to the service of the notice, a delay in the ability to
commence a statutory termination is a delay that most purchase
agreement sellers are unwilling to endure.
The provisions of section 559.217 dealing with the effect of a
counter-cancellation are not applicable to a section 559.21 notice,
and, therefore, the legislation does not authorize or envision a
counter-cancellation to a section 559.21 notice. Nevertheless, while
it is not clear, it appears that a buyer served with a section 559.21
notice can, within the thirty-day section 559.21 notice period, serve
and effectuate a fifteen-day section 559.217 initial cancellation,
despite the pendency of the section 559.21 notice. In Liebsch v.
140
Abbott, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a section 559.21
cancellation was ineffective as against a buyer who had previously
141
rescinded the contract (by written notice to the seller).
137. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002). The newly-revised residential
purchase agreement promulgated by the Minnesota Association of Realtors
specifically recognizes that a seller can still use section 559.21 upon a buyer’s
default. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 115116.
138. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21. As a result, if there is a failure of a condition and
the seller wishes to use section 559.21, the seller must wait until the buyer fails to
come to the closing before declaring a default and initiating a section 559.21
termination. See id.
139. Id. subd. 2a(5).
140. 265 Minn. 447, 122 N.W.2d 578 (1963).
141. Id. at 452-54, 582-83.
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Therefore, if the buyer’s fifteen-day section 559.217 notice runs
and is effectuated prior to the running of the seller’s thirty-day
section 559.21 notice, the seller’s section 559.21 notice will be a
nullity (without the buyer needing to obtain an injunction)
because, prior to the running of the thirty-day period under the
seller’s section 559.21 notice, the buyer will have already cancelled
the purchase agreement. As the Minnesota Supreme Court has
noted, “Once rescinded, the contract [is] at an end and [can] not
142
be cancelled by statutory or any other kind of notice.”
What can the seller who has already initiated the section
559.21 procedure do? Immediately after service of the buyer’s
section 559.217 notice, the seller might first withdraw the section
143
559.21 notice.
Thereafter, the seller could serve a section
559.217 notice so as to counter the buyer’s section 559.217 notice,
which would have the effect of defeating the buyer’s section
144
559.217 proceeding (while still terminating the contract). Such a
technique might prevent a seller who has served a section 559.21
notice from being pre-empted by a buyer’s later section 559.217
notice. Given the longer notice period under section 559.21,
however, it is probably inadvisable for a seller under a residential
purchase agreement to use section 559.21. The safest course for a
seller faced with a defaulting buyer would be to serve the shorter
145
section 559.217 notice in the first place.

142. Blosick v. Warmbold, 151 Minn. 264, 268, 187 N.W. 136, 137 (1922),
quoted in Liebsch v. Abbott, 265 Minn. at 456, 122 N.W.2d at 584-85.
143. Kosbau v. Dress, 400 N.W.2d 106, 109-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a seller can withdraw notice of cancellation during pendency of the cure
period).
144. Although the statute does not address the issue, it would appear that
service of a section 559.217 fifteen-day notice by a seller during the pendency of
the seller’s section 559.21 thirty-day notice would not be effective and would, in
fact, invalidate both notices on the grounds that that the buyer would be unduly
confused as to his or her allowed cure period. Under the theory that an
understatement of the permitted time in the notice presumably dispirits a
purchaser, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a notice indicating a thirtyday time period was invalid where ninety days was required. Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286
Minn. 257, 263, 175 N.W.2d 443, 448 (1970). Service of a fifteen-day notice
during the pendency of a previously served thirty-day notice is likely to unfairly
confuse a buyer and cause both notices to be ineffective.
145. Of course, in the case of a non-residential purchase agreement (not
subject to the new legislation), section 559.21 is the only available remedy (albeit
for sellers only) and considerations of a counter-cancellation by the buyer are not
relevant.
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B. No Proceeding
In addition to a section 559.21 procedure, there is the
alternative of not using any of the statutory proceedings.
Declaratory cancellation is a safe harbor (and a means of capturing
the earnest money), but, the new legislation does not appear to
change prior law regarding when a purchase agreement terminates
by its own terms without the need to provide the other party with
notice and cure rights. Therefore, in such a situation, neither a
seller nor a buyer is required to initiate a confirmatory declaratory
cancellation. Rather, in the case of a residential purchase
agreement where, due to lack of definiteness or contingencies, it is
clear that it does not meet the Romain test and need not be
terminated under section 559.21, a party may still simply rely on
the language in the residential purchase agreement cancelling the
146
transaction without using the declaratory cancellation procedure.
Of course, such party will not be able to rely on the imprinter of
prima facie cancellation provided by declaratory cancellation, but
such a benefit may not be worth the cost and time involved in
serving the fifteen-day notice and the risk of triggering an action
for an injunction commenced by the served party.
VI. TRAP FOR THE BUYER
There is a trap for the unwary buyer where a seller uses either
of the two cancellation procedures based upon an unfulfilled
condition. Most residential purchase agreements provide, by their
terms, that if the agreement is cancelled by reason of an unfulfilled
condition, the earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer.
However, the baseline rule under the new legislation is that upon a
completed cancellation proceeding, the earnest money is the
property of the party initiating the cancellation and the broker is to
147
deliver the money to that initiator.
Thus, where the seller
146. As noted supra, the form promulgated by the Minnesota Association of
Realtors states that whenever the purchase agreement provides that, as a result of a
failed condition, the purchase agreement “is cancelled,” it is to be “deemed a
provision authorizing” declaratory cancellation under section 559.217.
MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 118-119. To
the extent that language is read as requiring (as opposed to simply permitting)
declaratory cancellation in the case of an unfulfilled condition, use of this form
will eliminate the alternative of relying solely on the language of the purchase
agreement and refraining from using any statutory proceeding.
147. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 7(d) (2004); see also supra note 72 and
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commences either of the new cancellation proceedings based upon
failure of a condition, unless the buyer enjoins the cancellation or
serves a counter-cancellation notice (which would make the
baseline earnest money rule ineffective), the seller will receive and
be entitled to the earnest money upon completion of the
cancellation, despite the clear language in the purchase agreement
148
to the contrary.
Since the purchase agreement will have been
cancelled and of no force and effect, the buyer will not have any
149
judicial recourse against the seller and the seller will receive a
windfall.
As a practical matter, when a transaction collapses due
unequivocally to an unfulfilled condition of a buyer, sellers are
generally willing to negotiate a cancellation agreement with, and
refund the earnest money to, the buyer in order to remarket the
house. The refusal by the buyer in such circumstances would
ordinarily be without justification so that a subsequent sellercancellation and forfeiture of the earnest money might not be
unjust, especially since the buyer could defeat the forfeiture by a
counter-cancellation.
However, under various circumstances,
buyers may have good reasons not to sign a cancellation
agreement.
For example, if the purchase agreement is conditioned on the
seller’s purchase of another home, and the seller claims that the
condition has failed, but the buyer justifiably claims that the
condition has been satisfied or waived, a buyer would be justified in
not signing a cancellation agreement. Similarly, the purchase
agreement may be conditioned on the buyer’s sale of its existing
residence or satisfactory evidence of the buyer’s financial ability to
consummate the purchase without the sale of the existing
residence. If the seller unjustifiably claims that buyer’s evidence is
unsatisfactory, the buyer would be within his right (and welladvised) not to sign a cancellation agreement. In both of those
cases, however, the seller may choose to serve a declaratory
cancellation notice on the buyer based upon the allegedly
unfulfilled condition. The buyer would be well-advised not to serve
accompanying text.
148. See supra Part II.D.
149. See supra Part II.D. Unlike counter-cancellations, where a court has
authority to “consider the terms of the cancelled purchase agreement in making
its determination,” as provided in section 559.217, subdivision 2, under this
hypothetical, a court has no authority to consider a claim by an aggrieved buyer
for earnest money payments made under the now-cancelled contract.
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on the seller a counter-cancellation (even one based on the seller’s
default, rather than failure of a condition), because, as discussed
infra, service of the counter-cancellation would automatically
terminate the purchase agreement and constitute an abandonment
150
of the buyer’s claim for specific performance against the seller.
As a result, if the seller was to serve the declaratory cancellation
notice, unless the buyer was to procure an injunction, by operation
of the statute the seller will receive the earnest money, contrary to
the express provision in the purchase agreement that if the
purchase agreement is terminated by reason of the unfulfilled
condition, the earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer.
Even in the situation where it is uncontested by the parties that
the purchase agreement has failed by reason of an unfulfilled
condition, it is possible that a sharp-practicing seller might seize
upon the failure of any condition to immediately commence a
declaratory cancellation proceeding of the purchase agreement. In
all of these situations, unless the buyer seeks an injunction (or, in
the last case, commences a counter-cancellation), an unjust
outcome, albeit inherent in the statutory scheme, will result.
There may be a similar trap for the seller in the situation
(somewhat unusual in the residential context) where the purchase
agreement provides that if the transaction does not close due to the
failure of a condition, the earnest money is non-refundable to the
buyer as compensation to the seller for taking the property off the
market. In such a case, if the condition is not fulfilled and the
buyer initiates and completes a section 559.217 cancellation based
upon the unfulfilled condition, by operation of the statute the
purchase agreement will be conclusively cancelled and, despite the
parties’ agreement to the contrary, the earnest money will be
refunded to the buyer. In fact, in the situation where the purchase
agreement provides for the seller’s retention of earnest money
when the purchase agreement fails by reason of an unfulfilled
condition, the statute may give the buyer an incentive not to sign a
consensual termination. Unlike the seller who normally has the
incentive of remarketing the property, the buyer will have little to
gain from a termination agreement which, as the seller will
justifiably insist, provides for forfeiture of the earnest money to the
seller in accordance with the terms of the purchase agreement.
Rather, with nothing much to lose, the buyer may be willing to at
150.

See infra Part VII.
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least initiate a section 559.217 cancellation proceeding based upon
the failed condition, which (absent an injunction or a seller
counter-cancellation) will reap an undeserved windfall for the
buyer.
These buyer-traps and seller-traps expose a problem in the
underlying theory of section 559.217. The statute presumes that
the party initiating a cancellation proceeding is the wronged party
to whom the earnest money belongs. This theory makes sense in
the context of a default where the non-defaulting party (either the
seller or the buyer) initiates a section 559.217 cancellation
proceeding upon the defaulting party and, upon completion of
such uncontested (and uncountered) proceeding, the earnest
money should be awarded to such non-defaulting party. That, in
fact, is consistent with the long-settled Minnesota case law to the
effect that upon a seller’s completion of a section 559.21
termination proceeding based upon a buyer’s default, all payments
made by the buyer are forfeited to the seller, regardless of any
151
contrary claims by the buyer.
In the situation of a failure of the purchase agreement due to
an unfulfilled condition, however, section 559.217 does not rely on
the wronged party to initiate a cancellation proceeding, but rather
allows either the seller or the buyer to prosecute a cancellation
proceeding regardless of to whom the express terms of the
purchase agreement would award the earnest money. Since
neither seller nor buyer is really a wrongdoer in the situation of a
failed condition, it may be merely happenstance that section
559.217 awards the earnest money in accordance with the
expectations of the parties, as reflected by the terms of the
purchase agreement, or frustrates those settled expectations. This,
of course, is not a problem under section 559.21 since that statute
is expressly limited to situations of buyer default and does not
permit service of a termination notice merely based upon a failed
152
condition.
While a seller or buyer who would otherwise intend
to commence a cancellation proceeding under section 559.217 in
order to achieve a disposition of the earnest money contrary to the
provisions of the purchase agreement may be somewhat deterred
from doing so by reason of the possibility of counter-cancellation
or the in terrorem effect of a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees if an

151.
152.

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/12

36

Wertheim: Minnesota’s New Residential Purchase Agreement Cancellation Statu
12WERTHEIM

2004]

3/29/2005 2:52:42 PM

RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE CANCELLATION

723

153

injunction is sought,
the potential for wrongful windfalls is
unavoidable.
There is one possible caveat to this matter. Financing
contingency addendums for FHA and VA mortgages provide that if
the subject property does not appraise for a minimum amount, the
purchase agreement is automatically null and void and all earnest
money must be refunded to the buyer. Federal regulations with
regard to VA-insured mortgages require that all purchase
agreements to be financed by a VA mortgage contain a provision
that reads substantially as follows:
[N]otwithstanding any other provisions of this contract,
the purchaser shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of
earnest money or otherwise or be obligated to complete
the purchase of the property described herein, if the
contract purchase price or cost exceeds [the VA-approved
154
appraisal of] the reasonable value of the property.
Similarly, the federal housing requirements with regard to
FHA-insured mortgages require the following clause in all purchase
agreements to be financed by an FHA mortgage:
[N]otwithstanding any other provisions of this contract,
the purchaser shall not be obligated to complete the
purchase of the property described herein or to incur any
penalty by forfeiture of earnest money deposits or
otherwise, unless the purchaser has been given [an
155
appraisal of at least a specified amount].
If the conditions addressed in this clause are triggered, that is,
the appraisal is too low, and a seller serves a notice, under either
cancellation with right to cure or declaratory cancellation, and the
allowed time period expires without action of the buyer, section
559.217 dictates that the earnest money is the property of, and is to
153. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 6 (2004). It would appear that a court, in
the exercise of its equitable powers, should enjoin or restrain a section 559.217
cancellation based upon an unfulfilled condition where the effect of the statutory
proceeding, if not enjoined or restrained, would be to award the earnest money
contrary to the terms of the purchase agreement. In such a situation, the party
seeking the injunction is likely to be deemed the “prevailing party” so as to be
entitled to a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 559.217,
subdivision 6. Faced with the risk of such result, a party initiating the cancellation
proceeding may decide to withdraw the cancellation notice once an injunction
hearing has been scheduled.
154. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4303(k)(4) (2004).
155. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MORTGAGE CREDIT
ANALYSIS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE ON ONE TO FOUR FAMILY PROPERTIES, Handbook
4155.1, rev. 5 §§ 3-4 (Oct. 2003).
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156

be tendered to, the seller. However, federal law, in this case, will
likely pre-empt contrary state law and require that the earnest
money be the property of, and be tendered to, the buyer.
VII. COUNTER-CANCELLATION
As previously noted supra, while statutory termination by a
buyer is not authorized under section 559.21, the potential of
counter-cancellation under section 559.217 commenced by the
party first served with a section 559.217 notice is an unavoidable
157
Such a counterresult of the mutuality of the new remedies.
cancellation must be initiated by the served party prior to
completion of the first cancellation and such second service does
have the irrevocable effect of immediately cancelling the purchase
158
agreement.
While a party served with a section 559.217 notice
might seek an injunction under section 559.211¸ a countercancellation is far cheaper and easier to effectuate. Preparation
and service of a counter-cancellation notice requires far less legal
effort and cost as compared to securing a temporary restraining
order or a temporary injunction. Furthermore, the countercancellation, like an injunction, has the effect of frustrating the
initial party’s efforts to procure a quick and easy means of securing
the earnest money and requires the parties to seek judicial
resolution of that issue. Finally, unlike an effort to seek a
temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction, which may
or may not be successful, counter-cancellation always has the effect
of frustrating the effort to procure the earnest money (of course, at
the expense of surrendering any defense to cancellation of the
purchase agreement).
If a seller or a buyer initiates a proceeding under section
559.217, whether it be cancellation with right to cure or declaratory
cancellation, under what circumstances can the served party initiate
159
a counter-cancellation?
An examination of the various counter156. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217.
157. See supra Part II.D.
158. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 2, 7(e).
159. While the choice between cancellation with right to cure and declaratory
cancellation will depend on the situation, as long as some procedure is available to
both the party who is the potential initiator of a procedure and to the party who
potentially commences a counter-cancellation, it matters not which particular
procedure is used because any counter-cancellation will trigger the countercancellation rules under the new legislation. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds.
2, 7(e).
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cancellation scenarios is instructive. While a purchase agreement
transaction might fail for a myriad of reasons, essentially all those
reasons can be classified as one of three categories: (1) buyer
default, that is the buyer failed to close without justification (“Buyer
Default”); (2) seller default, that is, the seller failed to close without
justification (“Seller Default”); and (3) failure of a condition for
the benefit of buyer, such as financing, inspection, land-use
approvals, or failure of a condition for the benefit of the seller,
such as purchase or sale of replacement property (“Contingency”).
It is important to note in this regard that unless the served
160
party resorts to injunctive relief under section 559.211,
the
contentions of the party commencing the section 559.217
procedure will not be judicially tested.
Therefore, judicial
affirmation is not required as a pre-condition for either an initial
cancellation procedure or for a counter-cancellation.
A seller may initiate a proceeding by reason of claims of Buyer
Default or Contingency. In response, the buyer could commence a
counter-cancellation based upon a claim of Seller Default. In
addition, the buyer could also respond to a seller cancellation
notice based upon Buyer Default or Contingency by a countercancellation based upon that same (or another) Contingency. In
fact, as discussed supra, where a seller has initially commenced a
proceeding based upon Contingency, a counter-cancellation by the
buyer typically will be necessary to prevent the earnest money from
being forfeited to the seller in contravention of the terms of the
161
purchase agreement.
Therefore, where a seller initiates a
cancellation based upon Contingency, a buyer is normally justified
in commencing a counter-cancellation based upon that
Contingency under the theory that the earnest money should not
become the property of the seller, but rather should be refunded
to the buyer.
A buyer may initiate a section 559.217 proceeding by reason of
162
either claims of Seller Default or Contingency.
In response, the
seller could commence a counter-cancellation based upon a claim
of Buyer Default. It is more questionable whether such a seller
could commence a counter-cancellation based solely upon a claim
of Contingency. The statute does not, on its face, preclude a
counter-cancellation by a seller based upon Contingency in
160.
161.
162.

MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002).
See supra Part II.D.
See MINN. STAT. § 559.217.
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response to a prior proceeding commenced by the buyer based
163
If the
upon the same Contingency (or even Seller Default).
purchase agreement has been terminated by its own terms as a
result of the Contingency, the legislation permits declaratory
cancellation and nothing in the new legislation restricts either
party from initiating such proceeding (or commencing such
164
proceeding to counter the notice from the other party).
However, as previously noted, most residential purchase
agreements provide that upon failure of the Contingency, the
earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer. A countercancellation by a seller, based solely upon Contingency in response
to an initial cancellation by the buyer based upon Contingency (or
Seller Default), has the sole purpose and effect of denying an
immediate refund of the buyer’s earnest money. As such, while a
counter-cancellation by the seller may not be expressly precluded
by the new legislation, it is clearly contrary to its spirit.
Of course, if the served party does not dispute termination of
the purchase agreement and tender of the earnest money to the
initiator of the notice, no counter-cancellation notice can or should
be served. If, however, as outlined above, a seller or a buyer has
initiated either of the cancellation proceedings and the served
party has colorable grounds to contest the initiator’s entitlement to
the earnest money (claiming either that the initiator was actually
the one in default or, in the case of the buyer, that there was a
failure of condition), there is little reason for the served party to
forebear serving a counter-cancellation notice. Service of a
counter-cancellation notice, like service of an initial cancellation
notice, will likely require the services of an attorney. However, as
previously noted, the cost of the counter-cancellation notice is far
less than the cost of commencing a judicial proceeding and seeking
an injunction which, even if successful, will often accomplish
nothing more than is accomplished by a counter-cancellation—
preserving the opportunity of the served party to litigate
entitlement to the earnest money.
The only exception to the benefit of serving a countercancellation is where the served party, typically a buyer, desires the
remedy (or at least desires to preserve the potential remedy) of
specific performance. In that case, a counter-cancellation would

163.
164.

See id.
See id.
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automatically cancel the purchase agreement and make specific
performance unavailable. In that case, a buyer must instead seek
and procure an injunction against cancellation.
Except in the situation where a party is willing to bear the
time, expense, and uncertainty of litigating a claim for specific
performance (or at least desires to preserve the potential of that
remedy), counter-cancellation is thus in the interest of the served
party. As long as there is a colorable basis for a countercancellation, it is likely that well-advised parties to residential
purchase agreements will seize such opportunities and trigger a
stalemate. Moreover, since the reason that the one party will
initiate a statutory cancellation proceeding in the first instance will
almost invariably be due to a dispute between the parties that
precludes a voluntary cancellation of the purchase agreement, a
section 559.217 cancellation notice will often be followed by a
section 559.217 counter-cancellation notice like night following
day.
This analysis presumes that both the seller and buyer are
informed regarding their legal rights and options. Where the
served party is not aware of the remedy and effect of counter165
cancellation or does not seek legal counsel, then, of course, the
served party will not commence a counter-cancellation and the
initial cancellation will become effective. Also, in some cases a
party may refuse to sign a voluntary cancellation agreement not
based upon any recognizable legal theory, but simply out of anger
or frustration due to the failure of the transaction. In that
situation, if that party is served with a section 559.217 notice, the
served party is less likely to commence a counter-cancellation and
the new legislation will have the beneficial effect of resolving the
impasse.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The new legislation for cancellation of residential purchase
agreements represents an effort to provide an expedited method of
allowing sellers and buyers to resolve standoffs between the parties
with the broker in the middle holding the earnest money. It has
the advantages over section 559.21 of speed, a remedy for the
165. While the statutory notices advise the party served of the availability of an
injunction, they do not advise the party of the possibility of serving a countercancellation. Id. subd. 5.
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buyer, and a means of confirming the cancellation based upon a
failed condition.
The underlying purpose of the new legislation is to provide a
more efficient means of resolving seller-buyer standoffs. One
possible cost of this efficiency is the risk of bestowing windfalls on
sellers in the form of earnest money that the purchase agreement
required to be returned to the buyer. Moreover, given the likely
use of counter-cancellation notices, its unintended consequence,
however, may simply be to require the parties to escalate their
standoff by means of an exchange of formal, lawyer-drafted
statutory notices. These notices will release the parties from their
obligations to consummate the purchase and sale transaction and
will allow the seller to quickly remarket the property. But with
respect to what is often the more important matter of resolving the
entitlement to the earnest money, the parties will likely be left in
exactly the same position they would have been in without the
legislation. Given that result, one might question whether the
entire scheme under the new section 559.217 is an improvement
over the one-sided, but more determinative, prior procedure under
section 559.21.
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